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The importance of survivable radio communications in
contemporary EW threat environments cannot be overemphasized.
At the tactical level, in fast and fluid conditions, radio
will remain the primary means of communication for command and
control. Thus, it will be subjected to hostile EW efforts,
e.g., jamming, direction finding, interception, etc.
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to carry out a
comparative evaluation of several state-of-the-art frequency
hopping combat net radios in order to select the best
available choice for fielding into the Pakistan Army. The
methodology of evaluation is primarily based on the system
specifications provided by respective vendors. Greater
emphasis is laid on the anti-jamming performance and
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Test and evaluation (T&E) of a military system is an
important step in the acquisition process which must be taken
with extreme caution and circumspection. It should begin as
early as in the system developmental stage and should continue
concurrently, step by step, until the system is finally
approved and inducted. The design and execution of a sound
test plan is no accident. It requires thorough understanding
of testing techniques, the system under test, its operating
scenario, and above all, the honest and numerous restless
hours of hard work. The principal objective of T&E is to
reduce acquisition risk and provide insight into the system's
performance to meet the required operational capability (ROC)
.
It also enables the acquiring organization to know the
system's inherited flaws, which may be eliminated or improved
upon by devising changes in tactics and doctrine.
The objectives of this thesis are:
1. To describe the spread spectrum techniques.
2. To carry out comparative evaluation of the state-of-the-
art frequency hopping combat net radio (CNR) systems
based on the vendors' specifications.
3. To highlight broad guidelines for operation, test, and
evaluation (OT&E) / field trials of a system.
In pursuit of acquiring systems data, letters were written
to six world famous companies that manufacture frequency
hopping CNR systems. Appendix A lists the names and addresses
of the companies approached.
Chapter II is aimed at emphasizing the need for ECM-
hardened and survivable combat communication systems. It also
highlights the salient features and attributes of spread
spectrum (SS) systems, mainly the electronic counter-
countermeasures
.
Chapter III deals with the development of the required
theoretical knowledge of SS techniques. For this chapter, a
working background knowledge of digital communication and
signal processing is recommended.
Chapter IV briefly discusses radio communication concepts
at the tactical level. It also presents requirements of a
typical CNR system for combat communication.
Chapter V covers system evaluation, using both the
techniques mentioned before. It also integrates most of the
theoretical concepts of the prior chapters into practice.
Some of the limitations of this thesis work are enumerated
here.
Chapter VI presents conclusions and recommendations. The
recommendations and conclusions are mostly based on the
objective analysis from Chapter V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. COMBAT COMMUNICATION AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Command, control, and communications play an extremely
pivotal role in employing overall combat power in the con-
temporary battlefield which is saturated with all kinds of
highly mobile, lethal, and destructive arsenals. Of all the
available means of communication at the tactical level, radio
has shown tremendous promise due to its inherent character-
istics such as flexibility, mobility, speed, and cost
effectiveness. However, its serious disadvantage is its
vulnerability to the enemy electronic warfare (EW) threat,
namely interception, monitoring, direction finding (DF) , and
jamming. Hence, radio communication, by doctrine, remains
secondary to other means of communication such as line, radio
relay (RR) , satellite and message carrying agencies.
Nevertheless, at tactical levels in all mobile operations
of war, radio remains the primary means of communication
available to a battalion, brigade, or division commander.
Amidst the enemy EW capabilities viz-a-viz the versatility of
radio communication, a tough challenge has been posed to a
designer or operator. This challenge is to make friendly
radio signals covert and anti-jam (AJ) , thereby defeating or
suppressing enemy effects of electronic counter-measures
(ECM)
.
The branch of EW that enables the friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum despite enemy active ECM is called
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) . Some of the
electronic counter-countermeasures used are as follows: [Ref
.
1]
1. Spread spectrum (SS) communication.
2. Error control coding (ECC)
.
3. Null steering antennas.
4. Power management:
a. Turn radio transmitter off (emission control)
.
b. Vary transmitter's effective radiated power (ERP)
5. Alternate route transmission.
6. Dial tone transmission or burst transmission.
7. Mobility (non electronic).
8. Frequency management.
While there is no guaranteed technique that is perfectly
covert or jamproof, laser beam communication ranks very high
on the ECCM ladder. However, owing to its point-to-point
short range and less flexible nature, it is limited to only
specific applications. On the other hand, SS communication
systems, having greater flexibility, have proved very
effective and are widely used in ECM environments. Appendix
B shows some of the likely EW threats and possible solutions.
B. SALIENT FEATURES OF SPREAD SPECTRUM SYSTEM
Some of the salient features of modern SS systems are as
follows: [Ref. 2]




The bandwidth of the carrier is made much wider than the
bandwidth of the data or information.
3. Reception is accomplished by cross correlation of the
received wideband signal with a synchronously generated
replica of the wideband carrier.
C. SPREAD SPECTRUM SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES
SS systems, because of their signal power spreading, have
the following important attributes: [Ref. 1]
1
.
Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) can be achieved
with high processing gain and unpredictable carrier signal
with power being thinly spread below the noise floor. A low
probability of position fix (LPPF) goes a step further encom-
passing both intercept and DFing. Low probability of signal
exploitation (LPE) may include some additional features.
[Ref. 3]
2. Antiiam Capability can be achieved to a greater extent
by using an unpredictable carrier signal. The greater the
unpredictability and less response time offered to the jammer,
the less the chances of jamming. However, partial band
jamming and repeat jamming, depending on enemy EW capabil-
ities, may pose concerns under certain circumstances.
3. High Time Resolution is attained by the correlation
detection of wideband signals. Differences in the time of
5
arrival (TOA) on the order of the reciprocal of the signal
bandwidth are detectible. This property can be used to




A number of transmitters and receivers can operate in
the same bandwidth employing different pseudorandom noise (PN)
codes. Such systems are called SS Code Division Multiple
Access (CDMA) systems.
5. Message Privacy is inherent in SS signals because the
data modulation cannot be distinguished from the carrier, and
the carrier modulation is effectively random to an unintended
receiver.
6. Selective Addressing is possible by using different
codes assigned in a network. A transmitter can select any one
of the receivers by simply transmitting its code, and that
receiver will receive the message.
6
III. SPREAD SPECTRUM COMMUNICATION OVERVIEW
A. GENERAL
A spread spectrum system is defined as a system in which
the transmitted signal is spread over a wider frequency band,
much wider, in fact, than the minimum bandwidth required to
transmit the information being sent.
SS systems employ any one or a combination of the
following techniques:
1. Direct Sequence or Direct Spreading (DS)
.
2. Frequency Hopping (FH)
.




B. DESCRIPTION OF SPREAD SPECTRUM TECHNIQUES
1. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
Direct sequence signals are generated by modulating
the carrier with a pseudorandom code sequence.
The DSSS signal varying envelope: [Ref. 3]
s(t) = A * c(t) * cos { wt + 0(t)} (1)
where A = amplitude of carrier, c(t) = PN spreading code,
w=frequency of the carrier, and 0(t) = phase angle.
DSSS is similar to a conventional amplitude modulated
(AM) or frequency modulated (FM) communication link with code
modulation laid on the carrier. The simplest form of DSSS
transmitter employs Biphase Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) as the




















Block Diagram Of DSSS Transmitter [Ref. 3]
8
As shown, the carrier is not usually modulated
directly by a baseband information signal. Rather, the
incoming information signal, if not in data form, is first
digitized, then modulo-2 added to a higher speed PN sequence.
The modulation is performed by any fast acting analog
multiplier (a balanced modulator) . The bandwidth of the
modulated envelope is mainly determined by high speed code
sequence responsible to produce an SS signal. The ideal BPSK
modulation causes 180 degrees instantaneous phase shift of the
carrier, implying multiplication of s(t) by +1 and -1. Figure
2 [Ref. 3] illustrates implementation of Figure 1 and the
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Figure 2
Generation of DS Spread Spectrum Signals [Ref. 3]
The DSSS received signal along with some type of added
noise, after suffering transmission delay (Td) , is demodu-
lated by the receiver. The correlation of the synchronous PN
code with the incoming signal will despread the signal as








Block Diagram of DSSS Receiver [Ref. 3]
10
Use of Quadraphase Phase Shift Keying (QPSK)
modulation, although more complex, will have principal
advantages of increased covertness and more immunity to
jamming. The QPSK DSSS signal can be mathematically expressed
as: [Ref. 4]
s(t)= Al*cl(t)cos{wt+O(t) }+A2*c2(t)sin{wt+0(t) } (2)
where cl and c2 are two quadrature carriers with amplitudes Al
and A2
.
The block diagrams of the QPSK transmitter and


















































QPSK SS Receiver [Ref. 4]
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2. Frequency Hopping
Frequency hopping (FH) SS systems are frequency-agile
systems in which a very large RF bandwidth is generated by
changing the carrier frequency pattern over a wide range of
frequencies. The most general frequency hopped RF signal is
of the form: [Ref. 5]
s(t) = A cos (2*pi*f(t)} (3)
The function f(t), which describes the carrier
frequency as a function of time, determines the hopping
pattern and produces the FH signal. To provide privacy of
information, the hopping pattern is made unpredictable by
switching the frequency of the synthesizer using a
pseudorandom sequence. The technique, therefore, may also be
called "multiple frequency, code-selected, frequency shift
keying.
"
A simplified block diagram of a FH SS system is shown
in Figures 5a and 5b [Ref. 4]. Any of the PN code k chip
words is taken randomly to determine one particular frequency
to be mixed with the modulated bandwidth out of 2 k available
hop frequencies. Change in chip word per second is actually
the hopping rate, which in conjunction with the number of
available frequency choices, are two very important design
parameters. For most of the practical systems, the discrete
frequencies available should be typically on the order of 2 20 .
13
For fast FH systems, the hopping rate is much higher than the
data rate and will provide much greater band spreading as
compared to a slow FH system in which the hopping rate is
smaller than the data rate. Figure 6 [Ref. 3] illustrates the
fast and slow hopping signal waveforms.
As a result of greater signal spreading, which in turn
buries the signal much below the noise floor, the probability


































































































































































































Comparison Of Fast and Slow FH System Waveforms
[Ref. 3]
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becomes difficult. Hence, fast FH systems are more immune to
partial band jamming and repeat jamming. Also, using a non-
coherent / differentially coherent data modulation scheme
makes FH SS comparatively simple (based on synchronization)
,
economical, and one of the favorite choices for military
communications
.
3. Time Hopping Spread Spectrum System
Time hopping (TH) spread spectrum modulation,
identical to pulse modulation, switches the transmitter on and
off using a pseudorandom code sequence. In TH, the message
bit may be divided into a number of nonoverlapping subinter-
vals. One of the subintervals is selected pseudorandomly in
each bit interval, and a pulse is transmitted that conveys the
value of the bit. The subinterval selected is independent of
the bit value and is independent bit-to-bit. In a sense, TH
uses time slots, or subintervals, in a way that is analogous
to the manner FH uses frequency cells. Figure 7 [Ref. 2]
shows a block diagram of time-hopping system.
The time hopping system is relatively more vulnerable
to jamming as the signal may be interfered with by a deter-
mined jammer, keeping his transmitter continuously on at the
carrier frequency. Therefore, simple TH is not used in ECCM
applications but rather is combined with other systems such as
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Simple Time Hopping System [Ref. 2]
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4. Hybrid Spread Spectrum System
To get the advantages of any two or more types of
systems, most of the state of the art SS systems use a hybrid
(combination) configuration. The hybrid systems provide
greater jamming immunity and enhanced covertness. The most
common combinations used in SS systems are: [Ref. 2]
1. Frequency Hopping - DS System.
2. Time Hopping - DS system.
3. Time - Frequency Hopping.
5. Chirp Spread Spectrum System
Chirp SS systems mostly employ linear frequency
modulation (FM) in which the carrier frequency is varied in a
specifically pre-determined way using a typical ramp impulse.
This technique is commonly used in radar systems; however, it
can be very useful in communication systems too. A typical
simplified block diagram of a chirp signal generator which
utilizes a voltage controlled oscillator (VCO) to produce
varying carrier frequencies is shown in Figure 8 [Ref. 3].
The information input, represented by marks and spaces (M and
S) , is converted into a ramp waveform. These ramp voltages
are used to control the frequency of a VCO. The output of the
VCO is the chirp signal which is then mixed with a LO output
in order to translate it to a required transmission frequency.
[Ref. 3]
The receiver in this system uses a matched filter,
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Block Diagram Of a Typical Chirp Signal Generator
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frequency-swept signal. Chirp systems using non-linear
frequency modulation would pose greater difficulty to the
enemy with regards to signal analysis and demodulation. This
feature of the chirp system would make it a very good candi-
date for ECCM applications.
C. COMPARISON OF SPREAD SPECTRUM TECHNIQUES
1. Frequency Hopping (FH) and Direct Sequence (DS)
a. Since the instantaneous power density of FH is
more than when using a DS system, its LPI performance is not
as good as that of a DS system.
b. DS has better multipath performance provided the
multipath delays are larger than the DS chip duration (l/f
c
) .
c. Co-siting of FH is easily solved by good frequency
management and synchronous technique as FH does not suffer
from the Near/Far problem.
d. Modern digital technology and field-proven experi-
ence with FH are mature enough to produce an effective and
jamming immune tactical radio system at a reasonable cost .
e. Most of the components of an FH radio are
identical to those of a conventional radio set. This makes FH
more suitable for implementation as an add-on feature to
existing VHF radios.
2. Hybrid and FH / DS
a. Hybrid systems share both advantages and dis-
advantages of FH and DS techniques. Hybrid techniques are
employed in the following applications:
21
(1) When higher processing gain is needed but unobtainable
by using a single technique.
(2) When improved LPI performance is essential.
(3) When it is required to overcome severe multipath
effects.
(4) When no co-siting restrictions are imposed.
b. The LPI and multipath performance of hybrid
systems have a greater promise than FH systems provided the
co-siting requirement is not taken into consideration or the
future technology provides solution.
3. How to Select the FH Technique for Military Tactical
Communication?
Radio communication at the tactical level is based on
multiple nets. In a division scenario, about 200 nets operate
in an area. The principal disadvantages of DS systems as men-
tioned earlier are the Far / Near problem and reduced number
of available channels. For a low jamming margin, e.g., 12 dB
or less, a nearby interfering transmitter located at half
the range of the desired transmitter will prevent effective
communication completely. Therefore, for a tactical radio
system, using DS, code division multiplexing (CDMA) cannot
be used. This implies that the number of nets sharing the
same frequency in the same area is virtually limited to ONE
only. Hence, the two problems, co-location and the reduced
number of available channels, are enough to preclude the
use of DS techniques in multiple net communication. The FH
systems have more available channels, hence, high processing
gain, and no co-location problem if frequency management and
22
synchronization is taken care of. Good algorithms practically
used show that the latter requirements are fulfilled with a
greater degree of confidence.
23
IV. CONCEPT AND REQUIREMENT OF RADIO
COMMUNICATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
A. CONCEPT OF RADIO COMMUNICATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL
Radio is used very sparingly owing to its vulnerability to
the enemy EW threat. In all defensive operations of war
(except for counterattack and counterpenetration phases)
,
radio remains a secondary or standby means of communication.
However, in all offensive operations where movement of troops
takes place, radio takes over as a primary means of communi-
cation.
At the tactical level, especially for command and control,
radio is used in the form of a network. In a network,
basically a number of subordinate headquarters constitute
substations and the respective superior headquarters assumes
a control station function operating on the same frequency.
A typical infantry battalion radio network is illustrated in
Fiqure 9 (down to platoon level)
.
B. MODERN BATTLEFIELD TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Over the past few decades, the popular VHF band has been
sufficiently crowded due to the ever-increasing demand of
tactical communications. On the other hand, in response to
it, EW activities have also been intensified posing a








































Typical Battalion Command Radio Net Diagram
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Following are some of the requirements of a tactical CNR with
variations applicable to a specific adversary's capabilities:
1. Covertness / transmission security employing ECCM
techniques.
2. Communication security using digital codes.
3. Built-in error detection and correction codes.
4. Highly selective filtering in order to avoid co-siting
problem.
5. Simplicity of operation and training. No complicated
and time-consuming procedures in use; emphasis rather
on automation.
6. Cost effectiveness.
7. High inherent reliability and maintainability.
8. Prolonged operational life cycle.
9. Adding-on / upgradability of special features like
anti-jam (ECCM) , encryption, burst and data trans-
mission, etc.
10. Easy transportability.
11. Configurability in various versions; hand-held, man-
pack, vehicular (both wheeled and track vehicles) and
airborne.
12. Power manageability; capable of selecting transmitter





A. SCENARIO AND APPROACH
Based on the importance of command, control and communi-
cations (c3 ) , and keeping enemy capabilities in mind, military
field commanders recommend the purchase of state-of-the art SS
communication systems. The DOD of Pakistan, after thorough
deliberations, has approved such proposals, and hence, the
defense acquisition and procurement department in turn has
approached various companies which manufacture SS systems
worldwide. The companies in reply send promotional brochures
along with the system specifications. Of these brochures, a
comparative evaluation is done so that the authorities can be
more selective of the available systems by choosing the
systems which fulfilled the requirements. The selected
companies are notified accordingly to present the systems for
demonstration and subsequent field trials. The demonstra-
tions, when conducted, are to be watched keenly by concerned
authorities and the key features of system performance are
noted.
The next step is to take the equipment into the local area
and conduct field trials. The T&E is done based on the




The last step of T&E is to carry out T&E in the most
realistic field and environmental conditions by the user
organization (infantry, artillery, armour and engineers
regiments) duly assisted by the Corps of Signals. These tests
are conducted country-wide, preferably under simulated combat
conditions or during field training exercises.
The final and the most crucial step is to compile and
integrate all of the test results, carry out analytical study,
and submit recommendations for command decision. The priority
of induction is decided based on these recommendations, and
the entire acquisition plan is presented for final approval.
The final approving authority is duly assisted by the respec-
tive area advisors in reaching the decision of selecting a
particular system. Once the system selection has been made,
the acquisition and procurement process commences following
the procedural activities.
B. SYSTEM EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
For this thesis work, system evaluation is performed using
two methods: field trials (OT&E) and system comparative
evaluation based on vendor's / contractor's specifications.
The former method is kept limited and is aimed at providing
broad guidelines for more meticulous and detailed study. Each
of these methods is explained in the subsequent paragraphs.
28
C. SYSTEM EVALUATION BY COMPARISON OF VENDOR'S SPECIFICATIONS
1. General
The approach to system evaluation using the comparison
method is to determine the most suitable system for induction
into a military organization. The evaluation methodology is
based on the different types of specifications, e.g.,
technical, operational, environmental, etc. Each of the
important system specifications is assigned a point value
ranging from to 1 and a weight depending on its signifi-
cance. The quality of a system is determined by summing up
the total number of points after being multiplied by the
appropriate weighting factor. Hence, relative superiority of
a system is found by comparing the individual total grade
points. For this work, those parameters that are closely
related to ECCM performance of the system are heavily
weighted. Extra credit is awarded to the system for
additional capabilities, e.g., upgradability (add-on
facility) , multi-channel carrier and data communication
equipment interface, etc.
The fundamental limitation in this method is that it
is dependent on the system parameters provided by the manufac-
turer and cannot be confirmed for accuracy without the follow-
on field evaluation. This step in evaluation therefore, must
always be followed by laboratory testing and field trials.
For this thesis work, it is important to note that the
potential adversary's EW capabilities could not be spelled
29
out. However, to remain on the safe side, the evaluation is
based on the assumption that the system has to work in the
adequately dense contemporary EW environments, particularly
with regard to all types of jamming.
2. Evaluation Criteria / Measure of Effectiveness
This section will describe the various measures used
to rate the systems and will show the point value for each
criterion.
a. General Characteristics
(1) Frequency coverage. It is based on the
existing military VHF frequency band which is 30 - 88 MHz:
Full coverage = 1.0
Partial coverage = 0.5 - 0.0
(2) Number of available channels. It is based on
the maximum number of available channels with 2 5 KHz channel
spacing:
Over 2000 = 1.0
Less than 2000 =0.5-0.0
(3) Modes of operation. The various modes are
CLEAR, COMSEC, ECCM:
Depending on usefulness and variety of
modes = 0.0-1.0
(4) Power Source. Compatible with existing
mains, vehicular and rechargeable batteries = 1.0
Special / unique (simple) = 0.75
Complex = 0.5 - 0.0
30
(5) Power Output. Relative consideration for
long, medium and short range is based on tactical deployment
at brigade level. The underlined principle is to use minimum
required power for a desired range of communication:
Variable, 3 or more than 3 alternatives = 1.0
Variable, less than 3 alternatives = 0.5 -
0.25
Fixed =0.0
(6) Combat Net Radio (CNR)
.
Based on the brigade
/ battalion level tactical scenario where a new station can
enter any of the operating nets:
7 or more than 7 memorized nets = 1.0
Less than 7 = 0.5 - 0.0
(7) Remote Control Operation. Remote control
operation is determined on the basis of the level of head-
quarters being supported and the type of enemy artillery fire:
On field wire with remote control unit (RCU)
up to and more than 1.5 KM = 1.0
500 meters to 1.5 KM = 0.5 - 0.25
No remote control facility = 0.0
(8) Automatic retransmission. This facility
extends the range of communication and is extremely useful in
mountainous terrain where, at places, the signal strength is
significantly degraded due to intervening land features:
Provision exists = 1.0
Does not exist = 0.0
31
b. Anti-jam / ECCM Performance
(1) Hopping Rate. The higher the hopping rate,
the more resistant the system is to enemy EW efforts aimed at
signal exploitation:
Medium to fast = 1.0
Medium = 0.75
Slow to medium = 0.5
Slow = 0.0
(2) Number of preset channels. While working in
the normal mode, or especially in a net having a mixture of FH
and other compatible transceivers, preset channels would
enable rapid change of frequency in case of jamming:
10 or more = 1.0
less than 10 = 0.5 - 0.0
(3) Number of pre-set frequency tables.
Frequency changes follow a pseudorandom pattern within a
specific, preset table, but many preset tables would provide
additional redundancy and security to the hopping pattern,
thereby keeping the enemy busy guessing and correlating the
end points of a specific maximal code sequence:
10 or more = 1.0
Less than 10 = 0.5 - 0.0
(4) Synchronization
.
Synchronization of a trans-
mitter and distant end receiver is key for any FH system to
work. Related to human factors, it is essential that
32
synchronization must be performed conveniently and with mini-






This is a performance measure
in CNR, when several sub-stations in one net operate in the
presence of many nets typically at the tactical level using
same frequency table:
4 sets of over 50 or more orthogonal nets
over any frequency table = 1.0
Less than 4 sets of over 50 orthogonal nets
= 0.5 to 0.0
(6) Loading of keys / frequency plans.
(a) Speed and Ease in Loading.
Automatic = 1.0
Semi-automatic and Manual = 0.5 - 0.0
(b) Transmission Security of Keys.
Using secure transmission built-in
system = 1.0
Through other arranged means = 0.5 - 0.0
(7) Erasing of keys. To prevent system com-
promise in case of capture by the enemy:
Depending on time delay to erase / physically
destroy the keys = 0.0 - 1.0
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(8) Free Channel Search. To make communication
possible even in the presence of enemy barrage jamming, the
Free Channel Search (FCS) feature is extremely important. The
system in this mode will automatically scan, search, and
select a frequency free of jamming. However, this very feature
must always be considered along with the enemy capabilities
of Direction Finding.
Does FCS exists? Yes =1.0 No = .
c. Communication Security
The system's capability to maintain the security
of information in case of enemy effective interception using
encryption codes. Digital codes, number of keys, special
features and security grade are some of the factors considered
to grade communication security. This is, therefore, a
subjective evaluation = 0.0 - 1.0
d. Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse Protection
Specially fabricated components, inclusion of
protective circuitry, and elaborate arrangement to ground the
equipment will enable it to survive in a nuclear warfare (NW)
environment:
(1) Complete protection = 1.0
(2) Partial protection = 0.5 - 0.0
e. Design Parameters
Good design parameters would facilitate the main-
tainability, transportability and logistic supportability of
the system, keeping in view the diverse nature of weather and
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terrain and type of operation. Lightweight, more rugged and
modularly built systems, are certainly desired on the modern
battlefield:
(1) Weight. Lighter systems are more favorable
and the evaluation criterion is subjective: 0.0 - 1.0
(2) Ruqqedness. Owing to a lot of movement by
varying means, the more rugged the equipment, the longer its
life and enhanced reliability. The evaluation criterion is
subjective: 0.0 - 1.0
(3) Modularity. Modularity in design makes the
maintenance and repair of the system extremely easy and,
hence, minimizes the mean time spent on repair:
Complete modular design = 1.0
Partial modular design = 0.75 - 0.0
(4) Standardization. It allows lower cost due to
sharing of components within the system configurations and
with those already existing systems which are compatible. The
evaluation is subjective: 0.0 - 1.0
f. Repair and Maintenance
A good system design coupled with built in test
facility would greatly reduce the time to repair:
(1) Built-in Test (BIT / BITE)
.
(a) System having BIT / BITE = 1.0
(b) System not having BIT / BITE =0.0
(2) Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
.
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(a) Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) , more
than or equal to 1250 hours = 1.0
(b) MTBF between 900 and 400 hours = 0.75 -
0.5
(c) MTBF less than 400 hours = 0.25 - 0.0
(3) Mean Time To Field Repair (MTTFR)
.
(a) MTTFR less than or equal to one hour =
1.0
(b) MTTFR between 1-3 hours = 0.75 - 0.5
(c) MTTRF greater than 3 hours = 0.25 - 0.0
(4) Upqradabilitv / Add-on Capability.
A well designed system will allow system
modification and upgrading while maintaining its original
design in order to meet the challenges of the adversary's
future EW advancement. This factor will also enable the
system to remain cost effective and current for a longer time.
Evaluation criterion is subjective and is a
function of the type and degree of upgradability : 0.0 - 1.0
(5) Human Factors.
The system evaluation from the user point of
view, e.g., simplicity of operation, accessibility and
legibility of controls and displays, personal safety, etc., is
important and subjectively graded: 0.0 - 1.0
g. Environmental
The military systems are vulnerable to exposure of
extreme environmental conditions, e.g., temperature, humidity,
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underwater immersion, etc. A good system should, therefore,
be able to operate with undergraded performance in existing
country-wide environmental conditions:
Evaluation is subjective and = 0.0 - 1.0
h. Compatibility / Interoperability
Since simultaneous induction of the system to
replace the existing (old) system would be limited owing to
economic constraints, therefore, the progressive induction
approach while continuing to use the old system will be a
better option. The FH system so proposed for induction
should, therefore, be interoperable in non-ECCM mode with the
existing communication system currently in use:
(1) Compatible / Interoperable system = 1.0
(2) Non-compatible / Non-interoperable system =
0.0
i. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
A good system's filtering circuit design would
enable it to be co-sited in the same vehicle with insignifi-
cant mutual interference to other systems in proximity. The
non-interference quality is extremely important in multiple
combat net radios (CNR) operating in a common operational area
(at brigade / divisional level)
:
(1) No EMI to / from any VHF / HF system in the
same vehicle or in multiple CNR operation = 1.0
(2) EMI experienced, but can be managed by
improvisation = 0.5
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(3) Significant EMI, difficult to overcome =0.0
j. Transportability
Transportability, which mainly depends on the
physical structure of the system, is more significant at the
tactical level in varying terrain and weather conditions. The
various versions, e.g., hand-held, man-pack, jeep-mounted,
tank-fitted, etc. , will afford greater system flexibility and
favor human engineering:
(1) System transportable in all operations of war
in all weather and terrain conditions = 1.0
(2) System posing some sort of difficulty in
transportation = 0.5 - 0.0
3. System Evaluation Summary
Based on the criteria, three systems were chosen:
Thomson-CSF PR4G, Tadiran CNR-900, and ITT Singars. Table 1
summarizes the comparative evaluation of the system parameters
included in the MOE list as per paragraph 2 above. Table 2
includes only those parameters for which the information was
available about all the three systems. Table 3 presents those
parameters which could not be compared because information for
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SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS FOR WHICH ENOUGH INFORMATION
WAS NOT AVAILABLE
PARAMETER SYSTEM
REMOTE CONTROL OPERATION ITT SINCGARS SYSTEM
NUMBER OF PRESET FREQUENCY TABLES ITT SINCGARS SYSTEM
ORTHOGONALITY THOMSON-CSF PR4G AND ITT SINCGARS
SYSTEMS
MTBF THOMSON-CSF PR4G AND ITT SINCGARS
SYSTEMS
MTTFR THOMSON-CSF PR4G AND ITT SINCGARS
SYSTEMS
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D. SYSTEM EVALUATION BASED ON FIELD TRIALS, DENDRITIC
APPROACH (SIMILAR TO OT&E)
1. General
Operation test and evaluation (OT&E) of a system is
conducted by the user organization duly assisted by the combat
support and combat service support elements. It must be done
in the most realistic combat simulated environments. For a FH
CNR system, the one considered here, realism would be created
by simulating intense EW activity, e.g., jamming (all types),
direction finding, intercepting, etc. The key features of
performance, namely anti-jamming, co-location and man-machine-
interface, are keenly observed. The conduct of T&E should be
preferably planned in such a way that those personnel
operating, maintaining and repairing the equipment, when
fielded, must all be included in the T&E team. The proposed
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The initial OT&E may be conducted by a battalion level
task force with subsequent expansion to a brigade and division
level. The most preferable course of action may be to
integrate the T&E with field training exercises already
planned.
2. OT&E Objectives
a. To evaluate the operational effectiveness and
operational suitability of a typical frequency hopping
communication system with particular emphasis to anti-jam
performance.
b. To provide information on organization, personnel
requirements, doctrine and tactics [Ref. 6],
c. To verify manufacturer ' s specifications , operating
instructions, software documentation, publications and
handbooks [Ref. 6].
3. Critical Issues
a. Anti-jamming performance: Is the system resistant
enough to enemy jamming effort (all types repeat, narrowband
and barrage) in order to provide command and control communi-
cation at the tactical level?
b. Logistic supportability : Will a country like
Pakistan be able to maintain an efficient chain of logistic
echelon (repair and maintenance) based on its own indigenous
resources of men and material while keeping in mind cost
effectiveness?
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c. Interoperability: In order to ensure progressive
induction of the equipment on a priority basis, is it
compatible with the existing VHF tactical communication
radios?
d. Upgradability: Keeping in mind the future needs
of the modern battlefield command, control, communication and
weapon systems, will it allow interfacing and adding-on of
other sub-systems?
e. Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Co-siting.
To check the system performance, keeping in mind the military
standards as per the current manual on the subject and seek
answers to the following questions:
1. What is the quality of communication (voice /
data) when other nets (about 4 to 5 in number) using same /
different systems operate simultaneously?
2
.
How much interference does it create in other
systems in the proximity (located in the same vehicle / in
local area within a radius on 3 to 4 Km)?
3. How much interference does it receive when
working in close proximity with the other systems?
4. Evaluation Criteria / Measure of Effectiveness
The thresholds and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) as
shown in Table 4 will be taken as guidelines, and greater
emphasis shall be laid on the operational performance for each
test. The laboratory tests obviously will be more quantifi-
able, however, operational tests will be mission-effectiveness
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oriented. The integration of these test results would,
therefore, pay dividends.
TABLE 4
EVALUATION CRITERIA / MOEs
TEST DESCRIPTION MOE / THRESHOLD
Anti- j amming Voice comm; sig str= 5/5, BER = 1/1000
Data comm; BER = 1/100000
EMI / Co-siting As per EMI tech manual
Operational
Availability
Ao of 90% without add-on eqpt
Ao of 85% with add-on eqpt
Reliability MTBF > 1550 hours for normal mode
= > 12 50 hours for FH mode
Maintainability
(field repairs)




5. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA) / Dendritic
Approach
The test objectives with greater emphasis on critical
issues are best addressed by adopting the dendritic approach








































































* Performance checked under all weather &
terrain conditions
@ Performance checked for mutual interference
(freq management, BER, signal strength)
Figure 12
Partial Dendritic For Anti-jamming Performance Of
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Partial Dendritic Of Interoperability












Partial Dendritic Of Upgradability / Add-on





























Amdt in TO&E required




Partial Dendritic Of Logistic Supportability
For Frequency Hopping System
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E. LIMITATIONS
The OT&E work done in this paper is certainly not
inclusive of all the aspects of evaluation, rather it serves
as a guideline for a more in-depth evaluation and analysis
process. Following are some the limitations of the evaluation
done for the system under consideration:
1. Field trials could not be conducted due to paucity of
time and non-availability of equipment and manpower.
2. The OT&E detailed information could not be provided due
to security classification of the subject area.
3. The detailed EEA is not dealt with as it is beyond the
scope of the thesis.
4. The results of DT&E and OT&Es (done by other sources)
could not be included / consulted due to their non-
availability.
5. Simulation could not be done due to lack of time and
scope of the work.
6. The comparative evaluation is based on the specifica-
tions. At this stage it may not be verified by other
sources / means.
7. Some of the specifications have to be graded subjec-
tively due to non-availability of their exact values.
8. One of the most important considerations is the
comparative cost-effectiveness of the systems (the
initial and the subsequent spares cost) which could not
done, as such information was not provided by the
vendors.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conventional combat net control radios currently held
in the inventory cannot provide survivable communication under
the existing EW threat scenario. Therefore, a more
sophisticated combat net radio system capable of providing
security, covertness and anti-jamming ought to be fielded.
With modern technology at hand, frequency hopping combat net
radio is by far the best and most practically tested system.
One of the most important factors which must never be lost
sight of is the enemy's EW capabilities. They must be
accurately gauged and analyzed. Under an adequately potent EW
threat scenario, slow frequency hopping combat net radios will
be highly vulnerable, especially to spot jamming. The quality
of voice communication using medium frequency hopping CNR
would also be degraded significantly. Barrage jamming could
be more effective, but it would require huge power density,
which may become a remote option adopted by the enemy.
The most effective type of jamming employed against a
working CNR, would be repeat / follower jamming. Under the
present threat scenario, it is probably safe enough to use a
fast frequency hopping CNR. A fast frequency hopper will
provide greater processing gain, more jamming margin, and less
time of reaction for any effective hostile counter measures.
It will, however, remain a battle of achieving high speeds of
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signal processing, on both sides, using VLSI circuits,
surface-mounted components, and microprocessors.
Frequency hopping systems are comparatively more vulner-
able to detection and subsequent direction finding. This will
certainly increase the chances of destruction of own systems
by the hostile bombardment and commando actions / raids.
Moreover, it will also leak out some combat intelligence about
the layout, pattern and extent of friendly forces deployment.
Direct sequence spread spectrum signals have more
inherited covertness but lack one of the fundamental perfor-
mance features of "co-location". Therefore, its employment in
a CNR system is precluded. However, direct sequence systems
have far greater potential applications in point-to-point
radio links. The area of using direct sequence in combination
with other techniques, e.g., frequency hopping, is currently
under intensive research, and much of the work is classified.
As regards the system evaluation of specific systems
considered for this thesis work, the Thomson-CSF PR4G system
has shown greater promise as compared to the other two
systems. It, therefore, is a good candidate for fielding in
the Pakistan Army,s tactical level CNR communications. The
most significant features of the Thomson-CSF PR4G system
include its anti-jam capability (especially fast to medium
hopping rate) and add-on / upgradability . Other significant
features of Thomson-CSF PR4G include more number of preset
frequency tables, push button erasing of frequency keys,
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digital codes, and free channel search. The upgradability
program of the PR4G system with regard to the adaptive
antenna, burst transmission, multi channel TDMA, and
interfacing with existing / proposed data networks will
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The measure of similarity in the amplitude and phase of a
signal or code and a time delay replica of itself. In an SS
system, the autocorrelation of a spreading code with a delayed
replica of itself is of prime importance. The amount of
similarity in this case is the number of bits that are similar
(agreements) minus the number of bits that are different
(disagreements) between the original sequence and the time
delayed replica. [Ref. 3]
Base band
The original information band before modulation of a carrier.
An audio band from a microphone used to modulate a carrier is
an example of a base band. [Ref. 2]
Baud
A unit of signalling speed indicating the number of code
elements generated per second. In SS systems, baud is used
when referring to the rate at which the information or traffic
is being generated. [Ref. 3]
Baud rate
Baud rate is often used instead of baud. However, the correct
term for the signalling speed is baud and not baud rate.
[Ref. 3]
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Biphase Phase Shift Keying (BPSK)
A phase shift keyed signal in which the phase changes in
increments of 180 degrees. BPSK is often used for generating
a DS, SS signal. [Ref. 3]
Chip
In SS systems, a chip is a single element of a spreading code.
A chip may consist of one or more bits, depending on the
application. For example, a chip is a single bit for a
biphase DS signal, whereas a chip consists of two bits for a
quadraphase signal. Two bits are required in the quadra-phase
signal to control the four carrier phases, e.g., 00 for 0°, 01
for 90°, 11 for 180°, and 10 for 270°. [Ref. 3]
Co-siting / Co-location
A very important characteristic of tactical radios (particu-
larly the vehicular mounted versions) . This implies that for
a CNR it must be possible to operate two or more transceivers
belonging to different networks and placed in close proximity
of each other, and/or of other radiating equipment (such as
radars) , without the result being a babble of mutual interfer-
ence and background noise.
Chip rate
The number of chips or code elements per second generated by
the spreading code generator of a SS signal. Chip rate and
baud are both measurements of signalling speeds denoting the
number of code elements generated per second. Baud is
generally used when referring to the traffic, or information,
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and chip is used when referring to the spreading code. [Ref.
3]
Communication Security (COMSEC)
Consists of physical security, cryptosecurity, transmission
security, and emission security. [Ref. 7]
Coherence
The condition when a received signal and a receiver's refer-
ence are synchronized and in phase. [Ref. 3]
Correlation
The measure of similarity of two signals. The similarity is
generally based on the amplitude and phase of the signals. A
correlation peak indicates a maximum amount of similarity in
amplitude and phase. [Ref. 3]
Cross-Correlation
The measure of similarity between any two signals. In SS
systems, cross-correlation is used to determine whether or not
the received signals contain the desired coded signal, e.g,
correlating the received signals with a receiver-generated
code replica signal. [Ref. 3]
Direction Finding
A procedure used for obtaining bearings of radio frequency
emitters by using a highly directional antenna and a display
unit on an intercept receiver or ancillary equipment. It is a
useful intelligence aid to find out the enemy force's
deployment pattern and extent.
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Emission Security
The term usually associated with such effort is TEMPEST, which
refers to investigations and studies of compromising and
inadvertent emanations. An example of a compromising
situation is one where the input signal into a cryptographic
unit provides enough leakage to be detected. [Ref. 7]
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)
That branch of EW which deals with the actions taken to
prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electro-
magnetic spectrum. ECM includes:
1. Jamming. It involves deliberate reradiation or reflec-
tion of electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing
the use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems being
used by the enemy. Spot jamming is done against a specific
frequency or channel. Barrage jamming is done against a band
of frequencies. If barrage jamming is done with a noise-like
signal moving rapidly and irregularly, then it is known as
sweep jamming . If the jamming is made agile in frequency and
time, following the same PN sequence as that of the victim,
then it is known as following / repeat jamming . This is one
of the most effective ways of jamming. In it, the threat
signal is received by the ESM system, processed in real time,
and retransmitted along with noise. For the effective-ness of
this type of jamming, the time spent by the ESM and ECM
systems in receiving, processing, and retransmission must be
less than the hopping rate of the victim system.
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2. Deception. It deals with the deliberate radiation,
reradiation, alteration, absorption, or reflection of electro-
magnetic energy in a manner intended to mislead the enemy in
the interpretation or use of information received by his




The alteration or simulation of
friendly electromagnetic radiations to accomplish deception.
b. Imitative. Deals with introducing radiation into
hostile channels which imitates his own emissions.
Frequency Management
To avoid EMI / co-siting problems, one of the most important
factors is the assignment of frequencies to nets at various
tactical levels. In most of the state-of-the-art FH CNR
systems, frequency allotment is done using highly efficient
algorithms.
Free Channel Search (FSR)
A very important feature of an FH radio which enables a
network frequency selection outside the jammed bands for the
duration of push-to-talk.
Interference Cancellation (ICE) Equipment
A radio equipped with ICE equipment will greatly reduce the
effects of jamming. This is done by electronically steering
a null in the receiving station antenna, thus counteracting
the strongest unwanted signals.
In order to produce covertness by using ICE, a friendly jammer
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is integrated into the active radio net, thereby letting the
enemy receive strong jamming signals. This at the same time
will not affect the active net as it will cancel out own-
jammer strong signals.
Hopping rate
The rate at which the carrier frequency is changed in a FH
system. The hopping rate is defined as: [Ref. 3]
Hopping Rate = 1 / dwell time at a given RF.
In general, hopping rate is some multiple of the baud.
Modulo-2 addition
An arithmetic addition of binary digits. Logic gates that
perform this function are called Exclusive-OR gates. Examples
of the addition are: [Ref. 3]
+ = 0, + 1 = 1, 1 + = 1, 1 + 1 =
Multipath
A phenomenon where the signal reaches the receiving antenna
from two or more paths (usually a direct and indirect path)
.
The two signals may enhance or cancel one another depending on
the relative amplitudes and phases.
Near-Far Performance
Near-far performance describes the interaction of spread
spectrum systems with other users both near and far away from
the intended users. A frequency hopping system jumps to many
different carrier frequencies in a time interval and filters
the carrier frequencies with IF filters. Users outside the
bandwidth are rejected, and only the proper signal is
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demodulated. Since the IF filter passes only a narrow
bandwidth signal, potential interferers are more easily
rejected. [Ref. 3]
If some users of the frequency band are near the frequency hop
receiver and the frequency hop transmitter is far away, a
frequency hop system can more easily reject the nearby
interference than the direct sequence system can.
Orthogonal
This term is widely used for the following applications:
1. In statistics, for statistical independence.
2. In algebra, for vectors perpendicular to each other.
3. In coding theory, for describing a set of codes that have
zero cross-correlation coefficients for all pairs in the set.
Orthogonal FH
A modulation scheme that allows two or more FH schemes to work
at the same frequencies without interfering with one another.
The timing of the FH of each system is synchronized in such a
way that they never transmit on the same frequency at the same
time.
Power Management
In order to protect friendly ESM receivers from damage owing
to high power influx and at the same time ensure required
output powers for communication, it is essential that power
management, or in other words proper power allocation, has to
be done.
77
Processing Gain and Jamming Margin
Processing gain (G ) and one of its important derivatives
,
jamming margin (M- ) , are two very important SSS parameters.
They are quantitatively defined as: [Ref. 2]
For DS / FH SSS; G
p
= BW




= number of frequency choices (for FH only)
where fb and f c are information and chip rates respectively.
For TH SSS; G = 1 / transmit duty cycle.
For chirp SSS; G
p
= Compression ratio = D = fSHeep * tSHeep .
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A signal that appears to be noise before modulation (also
called noise-like signal, pseudorandom noise, pseudorandom
sequence) . This term is very commonly used to describe the
spreading code in SS systems. The PN, although having no
apparent pattern, repeats itself after a long time interval.
[Ref. 3]
Quadraphase Phase Shift Keying (QPSK)
It is a method in which the signal phase changes are made in




The process of eliminating the time delays between a received
sequence or signal and replica generated by the receiver.
Spoofing
The technique in which an unfriendly communication radio net
emulates the friendly radio net and transmits erroneous orders
or data in order to create chaos and confusion.
Signal Security
The protection of one's radiations from enemy SIGINT is called
signal security (SIGSEC) . SIGSEC involves both communication
security (COMSEC) and electronic security (ELSEC) . SIGSEC is
to SIGINT as ECCM is to ECM. [Ref. 7]
Surveillance
One of the techniques used for intelligence gathering. Most
obviously, plain messages may be intercepted. However, vital
clues may be given to the enemy by signature recognition, type
of modulation, operating procedures, or traffic statistics and
the number and direction of transmitters.
Transmission Security
Transmission security (TRANSEC) is designed to protect
transmissions from hostile interception and exploitation.
This is achieved by using covert systems employing spread
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